Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1996

The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims v. Neil R. Mitchell,
Lynda Wood : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John L. McCoy; Attorney for Respondent/Appellee.
John E. Gates; Kim R. Wilson; David L. Pinkston; Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Legal Brief, The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims v. Neil R. Mitchell, Lynda Wood, No. 960353 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/283

This Legal Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

UTAu

UTAH SUPREME COURT

L
KFU

45.9

DOCKET N Q . W # ,

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

In the Matter of the Estate of
Marjorie S. Sims,
Deceased,

Neil R. Mitchell
Petitioner,

Appeal No.
(Civil No. 933900278 ES)

Priority No.

Lynda Wood,
Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

APPEAL FROM THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS,
JUDGES BENCH, DAVIS and JACKSON

JOHN L. MCCOY
Attorney for Respondent/Appellee
310 S. Main, #1305
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
JOHN E. GATES
KIM R. WILSON
DAVID L. PINKSTON
Attorneys for Petitioner / Appellant
#10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 4500
Salt Lake City, UT 84145

FILED
SEP 1 8 1996
CLERK SUPREME COURT
UTAH

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

Respondent: Lynda Wood ("Wood")/ Personal Representative of
the Estate of Mariorie S. Sims

2.

Petitioner: ileii k. Mitchell ("Mitchell"), Successor
Personal Representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims

1

II.
I.

LIST OF ALL PARTIES

II.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
i
ii

III. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

IV.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1

V.

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

2

VI.

JURISDICTION

2

VII. CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

VIII.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.
B.
C.
IX.

Nature of the Case
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Statement of Facts

ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

POINT 2:

X.

2
4
5
8

THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS BOUND BY PROCEDURAL
LAW TO REJECT PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF BREACH OF
FIDUCIARY DUTY AS PETITIONER FAILED TO DISPUTE
THAT HE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES
THE TREND IN CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT
PETITIONER'S INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE
"AS IS NECESSARY", NOR DOES IT NECESSITATE
THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS

CONCLUSION

9

12
16

ii

III.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Board of Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co.,
46 A. 2d 280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946)

13

Bridgeport City Trust Co. v. Beech, 17 A. 308
(Conn. 1934)

13

Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950). . . 14
Estate of Dodge v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447
(Iowa 1979)

13

Estate of Lindgren, 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994). . .13, 14
Estate of Wells v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 174
(Ark. 1984)

13

Godfrey v. Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kansas 1991). 14, 15
In re Coats Estate, 581 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App.
1979)
13
In re Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, Neil R. Mitchell v.
Lynda Wood, 918 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). . 2, 9, 10
In re Martin's Will, 199 N.E. 491 (N.Y. 1936) . . . .

12

In re Seacrist's Estate. 66 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1 9 4 9 ) . . . 13
In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969) . . .

13

Jensen v. Bowcut, 892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App.),
cert,
denied,
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995)
10
Neilson v. Duyveionck. 263 N.E.2d 743 (111. App. Ct.
1968)

13

Purdue v. Roberts. 314 So.2d 280 (Ala. 1975)

11

Taylor v. Hutchinson, 4 97 P.2d 527 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1972)
13
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-711
2, 10

in

IV.

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

The following questions have been presented for review.
However, since neither presents a "special and important reason"
requiring this Court's review, the Court should deny this Writ of
Certiorari and dismiss this case:

1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals correctly uphold the

trial court's decision that a personal representative under a
will did not commit an actionable breach of her fiduciary duty
when she used estate funds in accordance with the plain language
of the will and the testatorfs intent since it caused no real
damages, even though she did not fund a testamentary bypass trust
as instructed by the will?

2.

If a will instructs a personal representative to place

the residue of the estate in trust and orders the trustees to
invade the principal of the trust and distribute principal to the
life beneficiary "as is necessary for maintenance and support . .
. ", may or must the trustee require that the life beneficiary
deplete her independent assets and resources before the principal
may be invaded, or is the trustee required to invade the
principal for any of the beneficiaries necessary living or
medical expenses?

1

V.

OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

The Utah Court of Appeals' Opinion in this matter is
published at the following citation:
In re Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, Neil R. Mitchell v. Lynda
Wood, 918 P.2d 132 (Utah Ct. App. 1996).(attached in Appendix
" A")

VI.
1.

JURISDICTION

The Utah Court of Appeals issued an Opinion in this

matter on May 19, 1996 ("Opinion", attached in Appendix A ) .
i

2.

The Utah Court of Appeals denied a Petition for

Rehearing from petitioner Mitchell on July 19, 1996 (attached in
Appendix A ) .
3.

The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this

matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) and (5).

VII.

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-711 is controlling.

(attached in

Appendix B ) .

VIII.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Nature of the Case
This case involves a claim against the estate of Marjorie S.
Sims, former personal representative of her husband, G. Grant

2

Sims, by Neil Mitchell, Successor Personal Representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims.

Marjorie was the original personal

representative under the Last Will and Testament of G. Grant Sims
("Will", attached in Appendix C ) .

Mitchell filed a claim against

the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims, a probate pending in the Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, under
Probate No. 933900278ES, claiming breach of fiduciary duty.
Under the Will, Marjorie was to fund a generation skipping
trust ("Trust") after Probate and Neil was to serve with her as
Co-Trustee.

Marjorie was the only principal beneficiary of this

Trust and was to receive, without condition, income from the
Trust and so much of the principal as was necessary for her
health, support and maintenance in the standard of living to
which she had been accustomed during Grant's lifetime.

Marjorie

did not fund the Trust, but withdrew funds from Grant's Estate
which she used for her health, support and maintenance in
accordance with the express terms of the Will.

Thus, Marjorie's

withdrawals did not damage the residuary value to the
Beneficiaries of Grant's Estate.
On May 8, 1993, Mitchell filed a claim against Marjorie!s
estate in the amount of $149,509.26 for cash deficiency in
Grantfs Estate which Wood denied on or about August 18, 1993.
Neil then filed a Petition and First Amended Petition for
Allowance of Claim, alleging that Marjorie breached her fiduciary
duty under Grant's Will and misappropriated his estate funds.

2

B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below

At the Trial Court, both Mitchell and Wood moved for summary
judgment on their claims.

After oral argument, the Trial Court

issued its Memorandum Decision granting both Mitchell's and
Wood's Motions for Summary Judgment in part and denying both in
part.
Mitchell filed a Notice of Appeal in the Utah Court of
Appeals from the part of the Trial Court's Order that denied part
of Mitchell's Motion and granted part of Wood's Motion.

Wood

filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on the part of the Trial Court's
Order that denied part of her Motion for Summary Judgment and
granted part of Mitchell's Motion.
Following the briefing and oral argument, the Court of
Appeals reversed the Trial Court's Order awarding Marjorie's
estate personal representative fees.

However, the court upheld

the trial court's Order denying Mitchell's Motion for Summary
Judgment and granting Wood's Motion for Summary Judgment.
Mitchell petitioned the Court of Appeals for reconsideration
of the part of the Order denying his Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court of Appeals denied that Petition on July 19, 1996.

On

August 19, 1996, Mitchell filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari
before this Court.

4

C.

Statement of Facts

G. Grant Sims and his wife, Marjorie, executed identical
wills on July 22, 1991, when they were both advanced in years and
confined to their beds in poor health.

R. 406-09.

They were of

significant wealth and were concerned in planning their estates
that they avoid large federal estate taxes.

R. 409-11.

Thus,

Grant's Will contained a bypass trust which named Marjorie as cotrustee with Mitchell, Marjoriefs nephew.

R. 271-74.

The Will

also contained specific instructions regarding Marjorie1s care
and standard of living.

R. 270-79.

Marjorie1s Will contained

similar provisions naming Grant as beneficiary and providing for
his care.

R. 271-77, Appellant's Br. at 29.

On November 14, 1991, Grant died leaving his last Will and
Testament ("Will") naming Marjorie as Personal Representative and
Mitchell as Successor Personal Representative.

R. 61, 117, 270.

The Will provided that Marjorie was to fund a trust known as The
George Grant Sims Estate Tax Bypass Trust ("Trust").

R. 271-77.

Marjorie and Mitchell were to serve as co-trustees of the Trust.
R. 271-72.

The Trust provisions in the Will mandated that

Marjorie was entitled to the Trust income without condition and
that "Trustees shall also distribute as much of the principal as
is necessary for her proper health, support and maintenance and
to maintain her in the standard of living that she enjoyed during
[Grant's] lifetime."

R. 272.

After all Marjorie!s medical and

5.

living expenses were paid from the Trust estate, the remaining
Trust corpus, if any existed at all, was to be distributed to the
remaindermen.

R. 272.

During the time Marjorie served as personal representative,
the Trust was not funded.

R. 398, 511.

Marjorie was over 82

years old, confined to her bed and in nearly constant need of
home nursing care due to her age and poor health.

R. 406-08.

Though she did not fund the Trust, Marjorie drew checks on
Grant's Estate for her medical and living expenses as provided in
the Trust.

R. 383, 398, 511-12.

Of the $96,642.55 which Marge

drew from Grant's account, $75,439.15 was used exclusively for
her nursing and medical costs.

R. 378, 383, 398.

The

reasonableness of these expenses was established by an affidavit
by Lynda Wood, who spent extensive amounts of time assisting both
Grant and Marjorie in their last years.

No counter affidavit

contesting the reasonableness of these expenses was ever offered
by Mitchell.

R. 406-08.

In addition, Marjorie accepted a $12,445.86 settlement of
Grant's personal injury settlement and withdrew $52,875.40 on a
certificate of deposit, plus interest and personal representative
fees.

R. 353-55, 383-84, 387, 400-02.
On September 2, 1992, Marjorie revoked the will which she

drafted at the same time as Grant, and signed a new will naming
Lynda Wood as her Personal Representative and removing Neil from
her will entirely.

Appellant Br., Addendum B.
6

On February 27,

1993, the day after she signed the accounting for Grant's Estate,
Marjorie died.

R. 7, 17, 282.

Following Marjoriefs death, Wood was appointed Personal
Representative of Marjoriefs Estate and Mitchell was appointed
Personal Representative of Grant's Estate and both continue in
those functions.

R. 14, 258.

On or about May 8, 1993, Mitchell

filed a claim against Marjorie's Estate which was denied on or
about August 18, 1993.

R. 17, 47, 161.

Mitchell followed with a

Petition and Amended Petition for Allowance of a Claim in Third
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and
moved for summary judgment.

R. 50, 207, 345.

Wood also moved

for summary judgment, admitting liability for $48,100.00 of the
$52,875.40 certificate of deposit, but denying Grant's Estate had
been damaged by Marjorie's withdrawals for reasonable medical and
living expenses.

R. 380-404.

Wood also claimed Marjorie, as

Grant's only heir at law, was entitled to the settlement of
Grant's personal injury action.

R. 380-404.

The Trial Court denied and granted both summary judgment
motions in part.

R. 510-15, 520-22.

The court concluded that

Marjorie's Estate was liable for $48,100.00 from the certificate
of deposit plus the personal injury settlement.

R. 511-13.

The

court did not find Marjorie's Estate liable for the remainder of
the certificate of deposit, as it had not been challenged by "he
petitioner, or for any damage in failing to fund the Trust.
511-13.

2

R.

Mitchell appealed the Trial Court's Order regarding
Marjorie's failure to fund the Trust and the remainder of the
certificate of deposit.

R. 510, 523-24.

Wood cross-appealed

regarding the personal injury settlement and related parts of the
Order.

R. 510, 531-32.

The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the Trial Court on the
matter of damage to Grant's Estate for Marjorie's living and
medical expenses and on the matter of the personal injury
settlement, but modified the trial court's order by denying
personal representative's fees claimed by Marjorie for $1910.00.
See Opinion at Appendix A.
Mitchell filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with this
Court on August 19, 1996.

IX.

ARGUMENT

The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari based on "special
and important reasons'7, pursuant to Rule 46, Utah R. App. P.
However, for the following reasons, the petitioner has failed to
show any

"special and important reasons'' within the meaning of

Rule 46.

Accordingly, the Court should deny the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari.

8

POINT I
THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS BOUND BY PROCEDURAL LAW TO REJECT
PETITIONER'S CLAIM OF BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY AS PETITIONER
FAILED TO DISPUTE THAT HE SUFFERED NO DAMAGES.
The Court of Appeals was bound as a matter of law to uphold
the trial court's grant of summary judgment as to Marjoriefs
living and medical expenses because the petitioner's claim that
Marjorie ^reached her fiduciary duty failed to prove any real
damages and therefore was not actionable.

Mitchell has claimed

that the Court of Appeals' holding that Marjoriefs failure to
fund the Trust as instructed was not actionable since it did not
result in damages, has excused her breach and thereby "sanctioned
. . . wholesale disregard for such testamentary instructions."
Pet'r Pet. for Writ of Cert, at 8.

Mitchell has also claimed the

court failed to consider the ambiguities in Grant's Will and
remand for the factual determination of Grant's intent.

However,

Mitchell's claims are without merit and do not result in "special
and important reason[s]" as required for granting a writ of
certiorari under Rule 46(a), U.R.App.P., for this Court's review.
First, the Court of Appeals has not excused Marjorie's
failure to fund the Trust as instructed in Grant's Will.

In

fact, the Court of Appeals made clear that "Mrs. Sims . . . never
funded the trust.

Instead, she withdrew $96,642.55 directly from

the estate checking account to pay her personal living and
medical expenses."

Matter of Estate of Sims, 318 P.2d 132, 133

1

(Utah App. 1996) .

However, without evidence of damages, the

courts below could not have found the breach actionable.
The statute upon which petitioner relies for claiming
Marjorie1s liability requires there be "damage or loss resulting
from the breach of fiduciary duty."

U.C.A. § 75-3-711.

In the

trial court, Wood offered affidavits and other evidence to show
that Marjorie used the estate funds in strict accordance with the
clear language of the Will and the testator!s intent.

Petitioner

did not contest these facts with affidavits or any other evidence
proving Marjoriefs breach resulted in damages.
The Court of Appeals found that "[bjecause Mitchell did not
challenge Mrs. Sims' expenses below, he is precluded from
challenging them on appeal."
892 P.2d 1053 (Utah App.), cert,
1995).

Id. at 135.
denied,

See

Jensen v. Bowcut,

899 P.2d 1231 (Utah

Without any proof that the failure to fund the Trust

resulted in damages, the Court of Appeals concluded "we agree
with the trial court's determination that, ^while there was a
technical breach of her fiduciary responsibilities to fund the
bypass trust, the breach resulted in no damages and therefore is
not actionable.''' Id.
Second, despite petitioner's allegations, the Court or
Appeals has not ignored the language and intent of Grant's Will.
The Court of Appeals looked at the language of the Will, the
relationship between Grant and his wife versus his wife's distant

10

relatives, and the judicial preference benefiting a spouse over
an unrelated remainderman.
(Ala. 1975).

See Purdue v. Roberts, 314 So.2d 280

Wood presented evidence that the plain language of

the Will ordered

rather than permitted the disbursements of

principal for medical and living expenses.

She also presented

evidence that the circumstances at the time Grant executed his
Will showed Grant intended to provide for his wife's health care
and living expenses first and foremost.

Mitchell offered no

contradictory evidence.
Even if Grant had intended his wife to exhaust all her own
resources to preserve his estate for his wife's distant
relatives, the courts below were not at liberty to disregard the
statutory requirement of damages for a finding of liability to
create an action for petitioner.

The Court of Appeals1 analysis

was as thorough and precise as possible under the statutory
requirement that there be proof of damages in order to find
liability for a breach of fiduciary duty.
Accor

ngly, there is nothing in this matter which is

"special or important" warranting this Court's attention.
Procedurally, the Court of Appeals was bound by Utah statute and
could not allow the claim to proceed without a showing of
damages.

The Court should reject the Petition on this point.

11

POINT II
THE TREND IN CASE LAW DOES NOT SUPPORT PETITIONER'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE "AS IS NECESSARY",
NOR DOES IT NECESSITATE THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS.

Petitioner has claimed that the lower courts1 interpretation
of the phrase "as is necessary" taken from Grant's Will which
modified the trustees obligation to invade the principal for
Marjorie's health, support and maintenance, has raised an issue
that this Court must review.

Mitchell has alleged that Grant's

Will required the beneficiary to deplete ail her own resources
before accessing the Trust principal.

Both the Trial Court and

the Court of Appeals rejected this interpretation of the phrase
"as is necessary".

Because the language in the Will was

unambiguous and modern case law from several jurisdictions
contradicts Mitchell's explanation, there is no "special and
important reason" for this Court to analyze the phrase "as is
necessary" and the Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be
denied.
The phrase "as is necessary" in the context of a trustee's
power to invade trust principal on a beneficiary's behalf, has
been well reviewed by many courts more recently than the Dunklee
decision upon which petitioner relies.1

1

The overwhelming trend

Petitioner has cited several cases in addition to
Dunklee which were noted for the Court of Appeals. All are
irrelevant to the issue at hand. In In re Martin's Will, 199
12

since the 1950fs contradicts petitioner's reading of the phrase.2
The Court of Appeals looked to a recent Montana
of Lindaren. 885 P.2d 1280 (Mont. 1994).

case,

Estate

As the conservator of a

testamentary trust, a beneficiary petitioned for an order
requiring the trustee to pay the beneficiary's nursing home
expenses, burial and funeral costs.

The trustee pointed to the

language of the trust limiting disbursement of the principal as
"necessary for her support, care and health during her lifetime,"

N.E. 491 (N.Y. 1936), the language of will authorized
disbursements of the corpus to the beneficiary, the testator's
cousin rather than his spouse, "as she may require" and not "as
is necessary".
In In re Seacrist's Estate, 66 A.2d 836 (Pa. 1949), the
testator authorized, but did not mandate, the invasion of trust
principal only if one of the beneficiaries became disabled with a
doctor's certification, and then only to a limit of $1,000.00 per
year.
Board of Visitors v. Safe Deposit and Trust Company, 46 A.2d
280 (Md. Ct. App. 1946), involved testamentary language allowing,
not requiring, the trustees, in their own discretion, to
distribute principal for his wife "if she needs it".
The language in Bridgeport City Trust Company v. Beech, 17
A. 308 (Conn. 1934), is discretionary and only authorizes
invasion of the principal which is necessary for his sons'
comfortable support.
In In re Will of Flyer, 245 N.E.2d 718 (N.Y. 1969), the
invasion of principal was conditional upon the beneficiary's
"sufficient moneys" and was also permissive rather than
mandatory.
All the cases cited in footnote by Petitioner were cited
before the Court of Appeals and therefore present no new reasons
justifying this Court's review.
2.
In addition to Godfrey and Lindgren discussed herein,
the Court should also note Taylor v. Hutchinson, 497 P.2d 527
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1972; Estate of Wells v. Sanford, 663 S.W.2d 174
(Ark, 1984); Neilson v. Duyveionck, 263 N.E.2d 743 (111. App.
Ct. 1968); Estate of Dodae v. Scott, 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979);
In re Coats Estate, 581 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); and see
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 128, comment e (1957).
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and argued this language required the beneficiary to show
financial need.

The Montana Supreme Court disagreed.

We will not interpret the liberal Trust language by way
of a limited reading of the word 'necessary' referred to by
the [trial] court as 'need'. The Trust does not provide for
the expenditure of Beneficiary's estate before any payments
are to be received from this trust.
Id. at 1282-83.
Additionally, the courts below considered Godfrey v.
Chandley, 811 P.2d 1248 (Kansas 1991).

This Kansas Supreme Court

case reviewed a will that left a trust beneficiary the rights to
the trust principal "as may be necessary for her support, health
and maintenance."

That court looked to a long line of cases

supporting the rule that "where a settlor directs the trustee to
pay the beneficiary so much as is necessary for support and
maintenance, an inference arises that the settlor intended the
beneficiary to receive support from the trust estate, regardless
of other income."

Id. at 1251.

The courts below have followed these well reasoned cases.
In contrast, Mitchell has asked this Court to reconsider the
decisions below based on an outdated distinguishable case,
Dunklee v. Kettering, 225 P.2d 853 (Colo. 1950).

In Dunklee, the

Colorado Supreme Court interpreted a will in which "[ijnstead of
directing the trustee to pay the beneficiary a sum to cover such
necessities, she merely 'authorized' him to provide him with the
necessities of life' as may be necessary." Id. at 854. Because
the language of the Will made the invasion of the principal
14

permissive rather than necessary, and since the beneficiary was
cared for well beyond the basic necessities of life, the court
concluded he did not need the estate's support.
The Godfrey court distinguished Dunklee on the facts and
circumstances "where the settlor manifests an intention that the
trust property be applied to the beneficiary's support only if
and to the extent the beneficiary is in actual need."
1251.

Godfrey at

Clearly, the Court of Appeals was correct in

distinguishing this case for rhe same reasons.
The analysis of the phrase "as is necessary" is not a
"special or important" task requiring this Court's attention.
Its meaning is clear on the face of the Will and the phrase has
been thoughtfully considered more recently than petitioner
indicates by several courts in different jurisdictions.

The

cases cited by Petitioner are all distinguishable from the case
at hand because the language of the Will in this case makes clear
that Grant intended to provide for all his wife's necessary
medical and living expenses.

The cases cited by Petitioner,

then, are not conflicting with the Court of Appeals.

Thus, there

is no "special and important reason" requiring this Court's time
and resources and Mitchell's Petition for Writ of Certiorari
should be denied.

JL5L

2L

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Utah Supreme Court is not
faced with "special and important" matters for decision and the
Court should deny this Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

The

Court of Appeals could not have made Mitchell's claim actionable
as Mitchell failed to show that Marjorie's expenses were not
reasonable under the terms of the Will and failed to dispute that
no damage resulted to Grant's Estate from Marjorie's withdrawals.
Also, the Court of Appeals correctly analyzed Grant's intent to
benefit his wife over the distant remaindermen, as evidenced by
the language of his Will and other surrounding circumstances.
Further, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the trial court's
interpretation of the phrase "as is necessary", requiring that
the expenditure be necessary, not that the beneficiary deplete
her entire estate before accessing her late husband's assets.
This ruling is clear from the plain language of the Will and is
well supported by the case law of several other jurisdictions.
Accordingly, there is no "special and important reason" for
this Court to review this matter and the Court should deny
Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
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In the Matter of the ESTATE OF
Marjorie S. SIMS, Deceased.
Neil MITCHELL, Appellant
and Cross-Appellee,
v.
Lynda WOOD, Appellee and
Cross-Appellant.
No. 950734-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 16, 1996.
Co-trustee and remainderman of decedent's husband's estate brought claim
against decedent's estate for monies removed
from husband's estate. Co-trustee and remainderman and personal representative for
decedent's estate cross-moved for summary
judgment. The District Court, Third District, Salt Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson,
J., granted in part and denied in part both
motions. Parties cross-appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Bench, J., held that: (1) decedent's estate was not required to remit to
husband's estate funds decedent had withdrawn from husband's estate's checking account; (2) decedent's estate was not entitled
to personal representative fee award from
husband's estate; (3) decedent's estate was
entitled to retain interest earned on certificate of deposit that had been part of husband's estate; and (4) decedent was not entitled to receive settlement from testator's
personal injury claim.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
1. Appeal and Error <^842(1)
Inasmuch as entitlement to summary
judgment is question of law, reviewing court
accords no deference to trial court's resolution of legal issues presented.
2. Executors and Adnr^Tstrators <£=>81
Although persons
nresentative's failure to fund husbanr
estamentarv tmct

quired to remit to husband's estate ftm^
personal representative withdrew from husband's estate checking account, given ^gj
provision that personal representative was
entitled to trust principal as needed for her
medical and living expenses and trial comfs
finding that withdrawn funds were used for
personal representative's support and maintenance.
3. Executors and Administrators <3=>256<4)
Trust residuary beneficiary, whose claim
against settlor's surviving spouse's estate for
monies she removed from settlor's estate was
denied, was precluded on appeal of that denial from challenging medical and living expenses of spouse, who, pursuant to settlors
will, was entitled to distributions of trusr
principal to extent required for such expenses, by his failure to challenge expenses
below.
4. Appeal and Error <3=>170(1)
Appellate court would not address estoppel argument raised for first time on appeal,
despite appellant's contention that issue was
not new even though argument was.
5. Executors and Administrators <2>501
Judgment <S=>185.3(1)
Estate of personal representative of testator's estate was not entitled to personai
representative fee award from testator's estate when personal representative's estate
failed to provide evidence to support award
after co-trustee and residuary beneficiary rf
testator's testamentary trust challenged fees
on summary judgment. Rules Civ.ProcRule 56(c).
6. Executors and Administrators <s=*313
. Interest earned on certificate of deporf
that was part of testator's estate was proper
ly retained by testator's spouse's estate, e**
though spouse, as personal represents^
had failed to fund testator's testament*?
trust, given will provision granting spofl*
right to receive estate's income without <***
dition.
7. Executors and Administrators <s=*49
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testator's personal injury claim on ground
that she paid large portion of testator's medical expenses; under survival statute, spouse
could recover settlement only in her capacity
as personal representative on behalf of estate, and could then present claim to estate
for out-of-pocket expenses. U.CA.1953, 78ll-12(l)(b).
8. Death G=>7
In wrongful death cause of action, heirs
of decedent personally hold claims for lost
support and other personal losses, while in
personal injury case, cause of action is owned
not by heirs, but by injured party.
9. Descent and Distribution @»45
Testator's surviving spouse could not
take testator's personal injury settlement as
testator's only surviving intestate heir; testator, who had will that designated spouse as
personal representative and devisee of personal property, did not die intestate.
John E. Gates, Kim R. Wilson, and David
L. Pinkston, Salt Lake City, for Appellant
and Cross-Appellee.
John L. McCoy, Salt Lake City, for Appellee and Cross-appellant.
Before DAVIS, BENCH and JACKSON,
JJ.
OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial court's entry
of summary judgment in favor of Marjorie
Sims's estate. Lynda Wood cross-appeals.
We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long
married life together. Mr. Sims died in
1991, leaving a will which provided for the
creation of a bypass trust and designated
Mrs. Sims the personal representative of his
estate. He also named Mrs. Sims and Mitchell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was
I. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was entided to the $2875.40 in interest and an additional

to be funded from the residue of his estate.
The will provided that trust income was to be
paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The
will further provided that the trustees were
required to distribute to Mrs. Sims as much
of the principal as necessary for her proper
health, support, and maintenance. After
Mrs. Sims's death, the residue of the trust's
corpus was to be distributed to other beneficiaries, including both Mitchell and Wood.
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as
personal representative, she never funded
the trust. Instead, she withdrew $96,642.55
directly from the estate checking account to
pay for her personal living and medical expenses. Mrs. Sims received an additional
$52,875.40 from the estate, derived from a
$50,000 certificate of deposit plus interest.
Finally, Mrs. Sims received a $12,445.86 personal injury settlement for injuries Mr. Sims
had sustained before his death.
Mrs. Sims died in 1993. Her will named
Wood as the personal representative of her
estate. Mitchell, as co-trustee and a remainder person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim
against Mrs. Sims's estate for the monies
that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr. Sims's
estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 from
the certificate of deposit in Mr. Sims's name
had been wrongfully taken from Mr. Sims's
estate.1 Mitchell moved for summary judgment for return of all the funds removed
from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed for
summary judgment seeking to disallow
Mitchell's claim.
The trial court granted in part and denied
in part both parties' motions for summary
judgment. The trial court found that Mrs.
Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that
she was nonetheless entitled to the $96,642.55 from the estate checking account.
The trial court determined that the funds
were used for her necessary support and
maintenance and that there was therefore no
damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the
certificate of deposit, the trial court found
that $48,100 was undisputedly owed by Mrs.
Sims's estate and ordered that amount paid
$1900 as personal representative fees.
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to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The
trial court also allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to
retain the $2875.40 in interest income from
the certificate of deposit and the $1900
claimed as personal representative fees. Finally, the trial court found that Mrs. Sims's
acceptance of the $12,445.86 personal injury
settlement was an improper diversion of the
money from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded
that amount to Mr. Sims's estate.
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's decision concerning the $96,642.55 that Mrs.
Sims withdrew from the estate checking account and the allowance of interest income
and personal representative fees from the
certificate of deposit Wood cross-appeals
the trial court's summary judgment in favor
of Mr. Sims's estate on the personal injury
settlement amount and award of interest.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1] Summary judgment is appropriate
only when no genuine issues of material fact
exist and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c); Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855
P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). Because entitlement to summary judgment is a question of
lawt we accord no deference to the trial
court's resolution of the legal issues presented. Id; Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151
(Utah 1989).
ANALYSIS
A. Estate Checking Account
[2] Mitchell first argues that the trial
court erred when it allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to keep the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims
had drawn from the checking account of Mr.
Sims's estate. Mitchell contends that because Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust provided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return
all the money to Mr. Sims's estate. We
disagree.
[3,4] Mr. Sims declared in his will that
2. Mitchell also claims that
topped from claiming Mrc

r

^od should be esIS'S estate had no

[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs,
Sims] without any conditions, all of the
income of said trust The trustees shall
also distribute as much of the principal as
is necessary for her proper health, support, and maintenance and to maintain her
in the standard of living that she enjoyed
during my lifetime.
The trial court found that although Mrs.
Sims did not fund the trust, she was entitled
to the funds since they were used for her
support and maintenance. The record reflects that Mrs. Sims spent approximately
$76,000 from the estate's checking account on
her medical expenses. The balance of the
money drawn from the estate's checking account was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses.
The accounting report and affidavit of the
accountant for Mr. Sims's estate confirm
these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely
that the expense accounting was irrelevant
because any money used was "improperly
converted from the estate." Because Mitchell did not challenge Mrs. Sims's expenses
below, he is precluded from challenging them
on appeal. Jensen v. Botvcut, 892 P.2d 1053,
1056 (Utah App.Xholding acquiescence to opposing argument before trial court precluded
challenge on appeal), cert, denied 899 P.2d
1231 (Utah 1995); see also Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) (stating
court will review only those issues presented
below unless exceptional circumstances or
plain error are shown).2
The language of the will clearly states that
Mrs. Sims shall receive distributions from
the principal of Mr. Sims's estate "necessary
for her proper health, support, and maintenance." Mitchell argues that, in other jurisdictions, the use of "as is necessary" language requires the beneficiaries of a trust to
exhaust their own resources before invading
trust principal. See Dunklee v. Kettering,
123 Colo. 43, 225 P.2d 853, 855-57 (1950).
But see In re Estate of Lindgren, 268 Mont.
96, 885 P.2d 1280, 1282-83 (1994). We need
not address that question because Mr. Sims's
decline to honor such a distinction." Ong Int'l
(U.SA.)
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will does not merely authorize the invasion of
the principal for "the necessities of life."
Dunklee, 225 P2d at 853. Instead, Mr.
Sims's witf mandates that Mrs. Sims shall
have access to the principal "to maintain her
[Mrs. Sims] in the standard of living that she
enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefore, we
agree with the trial court's determination
that <4while there was a technical breach of
her fiduciary responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in no damages
and therefore is not actionable."
B. Certificate of Deposit
[5] Mitchell challenges the trial court's
award to Mrs. Sims's estate of $1900 in personal representative fees and $2875.40 that
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from
Mr. Sims's $50,000 certificate of deposit.
Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's estate
did not properly petition the trial court for
the $1900 in claimed personal representative
fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 75-3718(1) (1993). Wood stated in her Memorandum in Response to Mitchell's Motion for
Summary Judgment that she deducted from
the $50,000 "$19G0 as fees for acting as personal representative." We need not decide
whether this qualifies as a proper claim pursuant to section 75-3-718(1), since Wood provided no evidence to support the fees after
Mitchell challenged them on summary judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Consequently, we reverse that portion of the
award.
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explicitly stated that Mrs. Sims was to receive the income from Mr. Sims's estate
"without condition." Thus, the trial court
properly allowed Jjrs. Sims's estate to retain
the interest from the certificate of deposit.
C. Settlement Pre

is

[7-9] Wood cross-appeals e trial court's
order to return to Mr. Si s estate the
$12,445.86 received from the settlement of
Mr. Sims's personal injury claim. Wood argues that since Mrs. Sims claims to have paid
a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical expenses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settlement proceeds pursuant to Utah's survival
statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides:
If prior to judgment or settlement the
injured person dies as a result of a cause
other than the injury received as a result
of the wrongful act or negligence of the
wrongdoer, the personal representative or
heirs of that person are entitled to receive
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by or on behalf of that injured
person as the result of his injury.

[6] Mitchell also asserts that the trial
court improperly awarded Mrs. Sims's estate
$2875.40 in claimed interest from the certificate of deposit. Wood argues that the money was interest earned from the certificate of
deposit in Mr. Sims's name and that, since
Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the beneficiary of all income from Mr. Sims's estate,
she was entitled to keep the interest earned.
Mitchell simply contends that because the
trust was not funded, Mrs. Sims did not have
the right to keep that money. We disagree.
Again, although Mrs. Sims did not fund the
trust as Mr. Sims's wiD directed, Mr. Sims

Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1 )(b) (1992).
According to Utah's survival statute, Mrs.
Sims could only recover the personal injury
settlement in her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Estate, 117 Utah 151,
213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that
she is entitled to the settlement proceeds is
misplaced. Behm is a wrongful death case
and not a personal injury settlement case.
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs
of the decedent personally hold claims for
lost support and other personal losses. See
Haro v. Haro, 887 ?2d 878, 879 (Utah App.
1994). In a personal injury case, by comparison, the cause of action is owned not by the
heirs, but by the injured party. As personal
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs.
Sims was therefore authorized to receive the
settlement only on behalf of his estate. Mrs.
Sims could then present a claim to his estate
for out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the
survival statute. She has never done that.3

3« Mrs. Sims's estate argues that because she was

is evident that Mr. Sims d\A not Ait» int#»«tat#>
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We therefore affirm the trial court's award of
the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate.
We have considered the other issues
raised, and we adjudge them to be without
merit. Accordingly, we do not address them.
See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah
1989) ("Court need not analyze and address
in writing each and every argument, issue or
claim raised.**), cert denied, — UJS.
,
116 S.Ct. 163,133 L.Ed.2d 105 (1995).
CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of the trial court
except as to the award of $1900 in personal
representative fees. That portion of the
judgment is reversed. The case is remanded
to the trial court for entry of a new judgment
consistent with this opinion.
DAVIS, Associate P J., and JACKSON, J.,
concur.
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Lewis Ricky YATES, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 950444-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
May 23, 1996.
Defendant was convicted of class A misdemeanor theft, following plea agreement before the Third District Court, Salt Lake City,
Leslie A- Lewis, J. Defendant appealed his
sentence. The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J.,
held that: (1) defendant was required to be
sentenced pursuant to statute amended following entry of plea agreement but prior to
his actual sentencing, and (2) defendant's
failure to appear for sentencing did not affect
property.

Thus, she could not take the settle-

his entitlement to lesser punishment set
forth in amended statute.
Reversed and remanded.
Bench, J., concurred in result only, with
opinion.
1. Criminal Law o=»1134(3)
Whether defendant is entitled to lesser
sentence when legislature reduces penalty
for crime charged after conviction but before
sentencing is question of law, to be reviewed
by Court of Appeals for correctness according no deference to trial court's conclusions.
2. Criminal Law <£=>1134(3)
Whether defendant's dilatory conduct affects his entitlement to lesser sentence is
question of law, to be reviewed by Court of
Appeals for correctness according no deference to trial court's conclusions.
3. Criminal Law 0=>1134(6)
Appellate court may affirm decision of
trial court on any proper ground.
4. Criminal Law e=>1130(5)
State's failure to cite to any helpful authority in support of its contention that resentencing defendant, convicted of class A
misdemeanor theft following plea agreement,
pursuant to statute amended following entry
of agreement but prior to actual sentencing
deprived state of benefit of its bargain under
contract theory precluded Court of Appeals
from considering such argument for first
time on appeal.
5. Criminal Law e=1206.3(2)
Defendants are entitled to benefit of
lesser penalty afforded by amended statute
made effective subsequent to their commission of offense and prior to their sentencing,
punishment is imposed as deterrent to crime,
as means of removing offender as harm from
society, and as means of rehabilitation of
offender, and not as punishment, and if legislature finds reduction in the penalty for given
crime necessary and appropriate to meet
those goals, then lesser penalty should be
granted to all defendants sentenced subsequent to modification.
ment as an intestate hetr.
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BENCH, Judge:
Neil Mitchell appeals the trial court's entry of summary
judgment in favor of Marjorie Sims's estate. Lynda Wood crossappeals. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
BACKGROUND
Grant and Marjorie Sims enjoyed a long married life
together. Mr. Sims died in 1991, leaving a will which provided
for the creation of a bypass trust and designated Mrs. Sims the
personal representative of his estate. He also named Mrs. Sims
and Mitchell co-trustees of the bypass trust, which was to be
funded from the residue of his estate. The will provided that
trust income was to be paid to Mrs. Sims, without condition. The

will further provided that the trustees were required tt
distribute to Mrs. Sims as much tf the principal as necessary for
her proper health, support, and maintenance. After Mrs. Sims's
death, the residue of the trust's corpus was to be distributed to
other beneficiaries, including bcth Mitchell and Weed.
During the time that Mrs. Sims served as personal
representative, she never funded the trust. Instead, she
withdrew S56,642.55 directly from the estate checking account to
pay for her personal living and rr.edical excesses.
Mrs. Sims
received an additional S52,875.4C from the estate, derived from a
550,000 certificate cf deposit plus interest. Finally, Mrs. Sims
received a S12.445.66 personal injury settlement for injuries Mr.
Sims had sustained before his death.
Mrs. Sims died in 1953.' Her will named Wood as the personal
representative cf her estate. Mitchell, as cc-trustee and a
remainder person of Mr. Sims's estate, filed a claim against Mrs.
Sims's estate for the monies that Mrs. Sims had removed from Mr.
Sims's estate. Wood conceded that $48,100 frcm the certificate
of deposit in Mr. Sims's name had been wrongfully taken from Mr.
Sims's estate.1 Mitchell moved fcr summary judgment fcr return
of all the funds removed from Mr. Sims's estate. Wood also filed
for summary judgment seeking to disallow Mitchell's claim.
The trial court granted in part and denied in part bcth
parties' motions for summary judgment. The trial court found
that Mrs. Sims had failed to fund the trust, but that she was
nonetheless entitled to the $96,642.55 frcm the estate checking
account. The trial court determined that the funds were used for
her necessary support and maintenance and that there was
therefore no damage to Mr. Sims's estate. Regarding the
certificate of deposit, the trial court found that $48,100 was
undisputediy owed by Mrs. Sims's estate and ordered that amount
paid to Mr. Sims's estate plus 10% interest. The trial court
also allcwed Mrs. Sims's estate to retain the $2875.40 in
interest income from the certificate of deposit and the $1900
claimed as personal representative fees. Finally, the trial
court found that Mrs. Sims's acceptance of „ne $12,44 5.3S
personal injury settlement was an improper diversion of the money
from Mr. Sims's estate and awarded that amount to Mr. Sims's
estate.
Mitchell appeals from the trial court's decision ccncerning
the $96,642.55 that Mrs. Sims withdrew from the estate checking
1. Wood argued that Mrs. Sims's estate was entitled tc the
$2875.40 in interest and an additional $1900 as personal
representative fees.
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a c c o u n t and t h e a l l o w a n c e of i n t e r e s t income and p e r s o n a l
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f e e s from t h e c e r t i f i c a t e cf d e p o s i t .
Weed c r o s s a p p e a l s t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s summary j u d g m e n t i n f a v o r of Mr. S i m s ' s
e s t a t e on t h e p e r s o n a l i n j u r y s e t t l e m e n t amount a n d award of
interest.
STANDARD C? REVIEW
Summary j u d g m e n t i s a p p r o p r i a t e o n l y when no g e n u i n e i s s u e s
cf m a t e r i a l f a c t e x i s t and t h e moving p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o
j u d e m e n t as a m a t t e r cf l a w . Utah R. C i v . ? . 5 6 ( c ) ; K i r r i n s v .
S a l t Lake C o u n t y , 855 P.2d 2 3 1 , 225 (Utah 1 5 5 3 ) .
Because
e n t i t l e m e n t t o summary judgment i s a q u e s t i o n of l a w , we a c c o r d
no d e f e r e n c e t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s r e s o l u t i o n of t h e l e g a l i s s u e s
presented.
I d . : F e r r e e v . S t a t e . 784 P . 2 d 149, 151 (Utah 1989) .
ANALYSIS

A.

Estate Checking Account

Mitchell first argues that the trial court erred when it
allowed Mrs. Sims's estate to keep the $96,£42.55 that Mrs. Sims
had drawn from the checking account of Mr. Sims's estate.
Mitchell contends that because Mrs. Sims did not fund the trust
provided for in Mr. Sims's will, she must return all the money to
Mr. Sims's estate. We disagree.
Mr. Sims declared in his will that
[t]he Trustees shall distribute to her [Mrs.
Sims] without any conditions, all of the
income of said trust. The trustees shall
also distribute as much of the principal as
is necessary for her proper health, support,
and maintenance and to maintain her in the
standard of living that she enjoyed during my
lifetime.
The trial court found that although Mrs. Sims did not fund the
trust, she was entitled to the funds since they were used for her
support and maintenance. The record reflects that Mrs. Sims
spent approximately $76,000 from the estate's checking account on
her medical expenses. The balance of the money drawn from the
estate1s checking account was for Mrs. Sims's living expenses.
The accounting report and affidavit of the accountant for Mr.
Sims's estate confirm these expenses. Mitchell did not dispute
Mrs. Sims's expenses, contending merely that the expense
accounting was irrelevant because any money used was "irnproperly
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converted from the estate." Because Mitchell did net challenge
Mrs. Sims's expenses
below, he is precluded from challenging them
on appeal. Jensen v. ^cwcut, 8S2 ?.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah
App.)(holding acquiescence to opposing argument before trial
court precluded challence on aoTseal) , cert, denied. 895 ?.2d 1231
(Utah 1955); see alsc Salt Lake~C->v y. Ohms . 881 P. 2d = 44, 847
(Utah 1994} (stating court will review only chose issues
presented below unless exceptional circumstances or plain error
are shewn) .2
The language of -he will clearly states -hat Mrs. Sims shall
receive distributions from the principal of Mr. Sims ' s estate
"necessary for her prccer heath, support, and maintenance.ff
Mitchell argues that, in other jurisdictions, the use cf "as is
necessary" language requires the beneficiaries of a trust to
exhaust their own resources before invadinc trust principal. See
Dunklee v. ^etterinc. 225 P.2d 852, 855-57~ (Ccio. 1950)/ But See
In re Eg-.S-e cf Lindcren. 885 P. 2d 1280, 1252-53 (Mont. 1994).
We need net address that question because Mr. Sims's will does
not merely authorize the invasion cf the principal for "the
necessities of life." Dunklee. 225 P.2d at S53. Instead, Mr.
Sims's will mandates that Mrs. Sims shall have access tt the
principal "to maintain her [Mrs. Sims] in the standard cf living
that she enjoyed during my lifetime." Therefcre, we agree with
the trial court•s determination that "while there was a technical
breach of her fiduciary responsibilities tc fund the bypass
trusty the breach resulted in no damages and therefcre is not
actionable."
B.

Certificate of Deposit

Mitchell challenges the trial court's award to Mrs. Sims's
estate of S1900 in personal representative fees and $2875.40 that
Mrs. Sims claimed as interest earned from Mr. Sims's $50,000
certificate of deposit. Mitchell first argues that Mrs. Sims's
estate did not properly petition the trial court for the $1900 in
claimed personal•representative fees pursuant to Utah Cede Ann. §
75-3-718(1) (1993) . Wood stated in her Memorandum in Response to
Mitchell's Motion for Summary Judgment that she deducted from the
$50,000 "$1900 as fees for acting as personal representative."
We need not decide whether this qualifies as a proper claim
2. Mitchell also claims that Wood should be estopped from
claiming Mrs. Sims's estate had no liability towards Mr. Sims f s
estate. Mitchell concedes that estoppel is a new argument but
contends that it is not a new issue. However, "[w]e decline to
honor such a distinction." Ong Int' 1 (U.S.A.i Inc. v. n t h Ave.
Corp. . 850 P.2d 447, 455 n.31 (Utah 1993). Consequently, we will
not address the estccoel issue.

pursuant to section
to support the fees
judgment. See Utah
that portion of the

75-2-713(1), since Wood provided r.c evidence
after Mitchell challenged them on summary
R. Civ. P. 5£'c) . Consequently, we reverse
award.

Mitchell also asserts that the trial court improperly
awarded Mrs. Sims's estate $2875.40 in claimed interest from the
certificate of deposit. Wood argues that the money was interest
earned from the certificate of deposit in Mr. Sims's name and
that, since Mr. Sims's will declared Mrs. Sims the beneficiary of
all income from Mr. Sims's estate, she was entitled to >eep the
interest earned. Mitchell simply contends that because the trust
was not funded, Mrs. Sims did net have the right to keep that
money. We disagree. Again, although Mrs. Sims did net fund the
trust as Mr. Sims's will directed, Mr. Sims explicitly stated
that Mrs. Sims was to receive the income from Mr. Sims's estate
"without condition." Thus, the trial court properly allowed Mrs.
Sims's estate to retain the interest from the certificate of
deposit.
C.

Settlement Proceeds

Wood cross-appeals the trial court's order to return to Mr.
Sims's estate the $12,445.86 received from the settlement of Mr.
Sims's personal injury claim. Weed argues that since Mrs. Sims
claims to have paid a large portion of Mr. Sims's medical
expenses, Mrs. Sims could retain the settlement proceeds pursuant
to Ufr&h's survival statute. £££ Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12
(1992). Utah's survival statute provides:
If prior to judgment or settlement the
injured person dies as a result of a cause
other than the injury received as a result of
the wrongful act or negligence of the
wrongdoer, the personal representative or
heirs of that person are entitled to receive
no more than the out-of-pocket expenses
incurred by or on behalf of that injured
person as the result of his injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-11-12(1) (b) (1992) . According to Utah's
survival statute, Mrs. Sims could only recover the personal
injury settlement in her capacity as personal representative of
Mr. Sims's estate. Wood's reliance on In re Behm's Est—e. 117
Utah 151, 213 P.2d 657 (1950) for the argument that she is
entitled to the settlement proceeds is misplaced. Behn is a
wrongful death case and not a personal injury settlement case.
In a wrongful death cause of action, the heirs of the decedent
personally hold claims for lost support and other personal
losses. See Haro v. Haro. 887 P.2cf878, 879 (Utah App. 1994).
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In a personal injury case, by comparison, the cause of action is
owned not by the heirs, but by the injured party. As personal
representative of Mr. Sims's estate, Mrs. Sims was therefore
authorized to receive the settlement only en behalf of his
estate. Mrs. Sims could then present a claim to his estate for
out-of-pocket expenses, pursuant to the survival statute. She
has never done that.3 We therefore affirm the trial ccurt's
award of the settlement proceeds to Mr. Sims's estate.
We have considered the other issues raised, and we adjudge
them to be without merit. Accordingly, we do not address them.
Se* Star* v. Carter. 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) ("Court need
not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue
or claim" raised.") , cert, denied."i16 S. Ct. 163 (1995;.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the order of the crial court except as to the
award of S1S00 in personal representative fees. That portion of
the judgment is reversed. The case is remanded to the trial
court for entry of a new judgment consistent with this opinion.

Russell W. Bench, Judge

3. Mrs. Sims's estate argues that because she was Mr. Sims's
"only surviving intestate heir," she is entitled to the
settlement proceeds. However, it is evident that Mr. Sims did
not die intestate. Ke had a will that designated Mrs. Sims as
the personal representative, and devisee of personal property.
Thus, she could not take the settlement as an intestate heir.

Qc^nniA _r*^

FILED
Utah Court of Appeals

JUL 1 9 1996
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Marilyn M. Branch
Clerk of the Court

—00O00-

In the Matter of the Estate of
Marjorie S. Sims,
Deceased.

ORDER
Case No. 950734-CA

Neil M^ cchell,
Appellant and
Cross-appellee,

Lynda Wood,
Appellee and
Cross-appellant
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10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
John L. McCoy
310 South Main Street, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited
in the United States mail to the trial court listed below:
Third District Court
Attn: Appeals Clerk
451 South 200 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dated this July 19, 1996.

Robin Hutcheson
Deputy Clerk
Case No, 950734-CA
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Case No. 933900278 ES

APPENDIX B

PROBATE OF WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION
possessed by the personal representative.
Thus, if the power is unexercised prior to its
termination, its lapse clears the title of devisees and heirs. Purchasers from devisees or
heirs who are "distributees" may be protected
also by § 75-3-910. The power over title of an
absolute owner is conceived to embrace all possible transactions which might result in a conveyance or encumbrance of assets, or in a
change of rights of possession. The relationship
of the personal representative to the estate is
that of a trustee. Hence, personal creditors or
successors of a personal representative cannot

75-3-711

avail themselves of his title to any greater extent than is true generally of creditors and successors of trustees. Interested persons who are
apprehensive of possible misuse of power by a
personal representative may secure themselves by use of the devices implicit in the several sections of Parts 1 and 3 of this chapter.
See especially §§ 75-3-501, 75-3-605. 75-3-607
and 75-3-611.
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding
section in the official text of the Uniform Probate Code is numbered § 3-711.

75-3-711. Improper exercise of power — Breach of fidu^ ^ c i a r y duty.
" tflKe exercise of power concerning the estate is improper, the personal
representative is liable to interested persons fqrjamage or loss rjsultin£X rom
breach of his fiduciary duty to the same extefflfasa trustee oi'arfexpress trust.
The rights of purchasers and others dealing with a personal representative
shall be determined as provided in Sections 75-3-712 and 75-3-713.
Historv: C. 1953, 75-3-711, enacted bv L.
1975, ch. 150, i 4.
Editorial Board Comment. — An interested person has two principal remedies to
forestall a personal representative from committing a breach of fiduciary duty, d ) Under
§ 75-3-607 he may apply to the court for an
order restraining the personal representative
from performing any specified act or from exercising any power in the course of administration. (2) Under § 75-3-611 he may petition the
court for an order removing the personal representative.
Evidence of a proceeding, or order, restraining a personal representative from selling,
leasing, encumbering or otherwise affecting ti-

tle to real property subject to administration, if
properly recorded under the laws of this state,
would be effective to prevent a purchaser from
acquiring a marketabie title under the usual
rules relating to recordation of real property
titles.
In addition. $$ 75-1-302 and 75-3-105 authorize joinder of third persons who may be involved in contemplated transactions with a
personal representative in proceedings to restrain a personal representative under
* 75-3-607.
Compiler's Notes. — The corresponding
section in the ofTiciai text of the Uniform Probate Code is numbered § 3-712.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 31 Am. Jur. 2d Executors
and Administrators § 528.
C.J.S. — 33 CJ.S. Executors and Administrators §§ 184, 207, 210 to 213, 215, 219, 220,
242 to 251, 272, 322.
A.L.R. — Liability of executor or administrator for negligence or default in defending
action against estate, 14 A.L.R.3d 1036.
Agent or attorney, liability of executor or administrator, or his bond, for loss caused to estate by act or default of his, 28 A.L.R.3d 1191.

Liability of executor, administrator, trustee,
or his counsel for interest, penalty, or extra
taxes assessed against estate because of tax
law violations, 47 A.L.R.3d 507.
Overpaying or unnecessarily paying tax, liability of executor or administrator to estate because of, 55 A.L.R.3d 785.
Garnishment against executor or administrator by creditor of estate, 60 A.L.R.3d 1301.
Key Numbers. — Executors and Administrators «=• 91, 103, 104, 116 to 120.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE
OF:

: MEMORANDUM DECISION
:

CASE NO. 933900278

MARJORIE 8. SIMS,
Deceased.

The above-referenced matter is before the Court on reciprocal
Motions for Summary Judgment.

The petitioner, Neil Mitchell, as

successor personal representative of the Estate of G. Grant Sims,
originally filed his Motion for Summary Judgment seeking an Order
from this Court that the original personal representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims, prior to her demise, failed to act in
accordance with Mr. Sims' Will in funding a bypass trust, and was
therefore required to return to Mr. Sims7 Estate certain funds
which the petitioner believes were inappropriately used by Mrs.
Sims-

Inasmuch as Mrs. Sims is deceased, the petitioner seeks

repayment from the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims.
The

Estate

representative

of

Marjorie

Lynda

Wood,

S.

Sims,

through

has

filed

in

its

response

personal
to

the

aforementioned Motion for Summary Judgment, a counter Motion for
Summary Judgment seeking from this Court an Order that the Estate
of G. Grant Sims is not entitled to repayment of sums used by Mrs.
Sims during her lifetime in her capacity as personal representative

SIMS ESTATE

PAGE TWO

of Mr. Sims1 Estate.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

The Estate of Marjorie S. Sims does agree,

however, that certain cash funds retained by Mrs, Sims while she
was acting as personal representative of the Estate of Mr. Sims
should be returned

and has offered to return $48,100 of the

$52,875.40 that the petitioner claimed was not deposited into Mr.
Sims' Estate accounts. The difference between the $48,100 and the
$52,875.40 are outlined in the Memoranda filed by Mr. McCoy on
behalf of Lynda Wood, personal representative of the Marjorie S.
Sims Estate, and have not been challenged as being inappropriate by
the petitioner.
While it is without dispute in this matter that Mrs. Sims as
personal representative did not fund the trust as her deceased
husband's Will provided, the manner in which she used the funds
were, as a matter of law, funds that she would have been entitled
to receive had she funded the trust as Mr. Sims' Will provided. The
terms of the trust would have allowed Mrs. Sims to receive the
funds

she

took,

without

any

depletion

of

her

own

funds.

Accordingly, while there was a technical breach of her fiduciary
responsibilities to fund the bypass trust, the breach resulted in
no damages and therefore is not actionable.
The intent of Mr. Sims was to benefit his spouse, rather than
conserve his Estate for residual beneficiaries.

That purpose was

SIMS ESTATE
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

adhered to by Mrs. Sims, albeit not in strict compliance with the
formal procedures his Will required.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the Estate
of Marjorie Sims has no obligation to repay the Estate of G. Grant
Sims,

with

the

exception

of the

$48,100 which

the personal

representative of Marjorie Sims has offered to return heretofore.
As those funds should properly be with the Estate of Grant Sims,
the Estate of Marjorie Sims is to repay that amount to his Estate
forthwith.
There is a question regarding funds received by Mrs. Sims in
her capacity as personal representative of Mr. Sims' Estate for
personal injury and a subsequent settlement after Mr. Sims died.
The evidence is undisputed that the personal injury claim arose
before Mr. Sims' death, but was settled after his death.

The

applicable statutory provisions provide that the only claims that
survive a death are claims for expenses related to the injury,
where the death of the personal injury claimant is not related to
the personal injury claim.

The settlement was for $12,445.86, and

as it was received after the death of Mr. Sims, it was for actual
expenses incurred by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury,
and pursuant to statute is required to be paid over to the personal
representative of the deceased's (Mr. Sims') Estate, or the heirs

SIMS ESTATE
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of the deceased if a death was intestate. As Mr. Sims did not die
intestate, the funds were properly paid to Mrs. Sims in her
capacity as personal representative, and should have been deposited
in the accounts for the Estate, the funds representing expenses
incurred personally by Mr. Sims as a result of the personal injury
case.
Accordingly, the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims is also required
to repay the Estate of G. Grant Sims the sum of $12,445.86,
representing

an

improper

diversion

of

the

personal

injury

settlement funds received by Mrs. Sims after her husband's death.
Based upon the foregoing, the Court has granted the Summary
Judgment of the petitioner, Neil Mitchell, in part as it relates to
the personal injury settlement funds, and has granted the Summary
Judgment of the personal representative of the Marjorie S. Sims
Estate in part.

The Court determines that the amounts to be paid

from Marjorie S. Sims Estate to the G. Grant Sims Estate of $48,100
is not subject to this Summary Judgment, even though the Order
should contain a requirement for such payment based upon the fact
that

said

sums

have

been

offered

and

outstanding

for

some

substantial period of time and have not really been at issue.
Counsel for the parties are to confer and determine the manner
in which an appropriate Order encompassing the decisions of this

SIMS ESTATE
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Court on the reciprocal Motions for Summary
drafted.

Judgment can be

Inasmuch as the Court has partially granted each Motion

for Summary Judgment, the Order needs to provide that an approval
as to form, or the participation in the preparation of an Order
encompassing the Court's rulings on these reciprocal Motions for
Summary Judgment does not constitute a waiver of either side to
object and pursue an appropriate appeal in relation to the Court's
ruling contained in the Order.
Once the Order has been properly prepared and approved by both
sides as being reflective of this Court's decision, the same should
be submitted to the Court for its reviey/and signature pursuant to
the Code of Judicial Administration./
LIS
Dated th:

Iday of March/ 1995.

M^mKMJ
'TIMOTHY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OP AN
ORIGINAL DOCUW ENT ON FILE IN THE THIRO
DISTRICT COURT. SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH.

IfiNO^—
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this,
March, 1995:

John L. McCoy
Attorney for Personal Representative
Lynda Wood
310 S. Main, Suite 1305
Salt Lake City, Utah
84101
John E. Gates
Kim R, Wilson
Attorneys for Personal Representative
Neil Mitchell
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145

.day of

JOHN E. GATES (A1169)
KIM R. WILSON (A3512)
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell, Successor
Personal Representative of the
Estate of G. Grant Sims
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
Post Office Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Telephone: (801) 521-9000
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate

ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

of
MARJORIE S. SIMS,

Probate No. 933900278 ES
Timothy R. Hanson

Deceased.

The Motion for Summary Judgment of Neil R. Mitchell
("Mitchell"), as Successor Personal Representative of the Estate
of G. Grant Sims (the "Motion for Summary Judgment") seeking
allowance of Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of
Claim and the Motion for Summary Judgment of Lynda Wood as
Personal Representative of the Estate of Marjorie S. Sims (the
"Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment") 'seeking denial of Mitchell's
First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim came on for hearing
pursuant to notice, before the above-entitled court, the
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson presiding, on January 13, 1995, at
2:00 p.m. and Kim R. Wilson appeared for Mitchell and John L.
McCoy appeared for Wood, and the Court having considered the

motions, the memoranda and affidavits supporting and opposing the
motions and the files and records herein, having heard arguments
of counsel, having issued its Memorandum Decision dated March 13,
1995, which is incorporated herein by reference, and being fully
advised in the premises and good cause appearing therefor, it is
hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Mitchell's entitlement to payment of the sum of

$48,100.00 is not contested, and Wood, be and the same is hereby
directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of 548,100.00
together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993, until paid
at the statutory rate of 10% per annum.
2.

The Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in part and

denied in part.
3.

The Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted in

part and denied in part.
4.

In addition to the amounts provided in Paragraph 1,

Mitchell!s claim is approved and allowed in the sum of $12,445.86
and Wood is directed to forthwith pay to Mitchell the sum of
$12,445.86 together with interest thereon from August 27, 1993,
until paid, at the statutory rate of io% per annum.
5.

Recovery is denied for all other amounts sought in

Mitchell's First Amended Petition for Allowance of Claim.

-2-

6.

In accordance with Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil

Procedure, the court determines that there is no just reason for
delay, and this Order is deemed to be a ferial
DATED this

nQ

judgment.
1995.

day of

imothy R. HansorT^^ .7
ADistrict
Court Judg^ J?

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
SNOW, CHRISTENSE1

TINEAU

u^cia^^—
'Attorneys for Neil R. Mitchell,
Successor Personal Representative
of the Estate of G. Grant Sims

hn L. McCoy
ttorney for Lynda Woo^" Personal
Representative ox the Estate
of Marjorie
S/Sims
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FILED DISTRICT CGURT
Third Judicial District

OEC 2 ^ 1991
LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF
GEORGE GRANT SIMS
I, GEORGE GRANT SIMS, a resident of Salt Lake City, Utah,
being of sound and disposing mind and memory, do hereby make and
publish this, my Last Will and Testament.
ARTICLE £
REVOCATION OF PRIOR WILLS AND CODICILS
I hereby revoke all other wills and codicils heretofore made
by me,
ARTICLE II
WIFE AND BENEFICIARIES
I am married t o MARJORIE S. SIMS ( h e r e i n a f t e r
"my w i f e " ) .

r e f e r r e d t o as

The b e n e f i c i a r y of my e s t a t e w i l l be my w i f e

o u t r i g h t or i n t r u s t , o r b o t h , a s h e r e i n a f t e r

set

(either

forth) or,

if

s h e p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f my e s t a t e s h a l l be t h e
individuals

named or i n d i c a t e d in A r t i c l e V*
ARTICLE I I I

PAYMENT OF TAXES, DEBTS AND EXPENSES
I direct that all of my due and unpaid debts, all expenses
of my last illness, burial, and the administration of my estate,
and all taxes due at the date of my death or as a result of my
death, shall be paid as soon after my death as practical.

ARTICLE .IV
BEQUEST OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND EFFECTS
I

hereby

give,

devise

tangible personal property

and b e q u e a t h

certain

to those persons

items

be, prepared,

my

in t h e manner s e t

forth in a written s t a t e m e n t or l i s t which has been,
will

of

or

which

d a t e d and s i g n e d by me a n d a t t a c h e d t o

this

W i l l and w h i c h s t a t e m e n t o r l i s t I i n t e n d t o be i n e x i s t e n c e
t h e t i m e of

my d e a t h .

the d e v i s e e s

thereof.

effects,

Said l i r t

describes

the

including a l l

if

household f u r n i t u r e

my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s

and e f f e c t s
part

of

not s e t

the

hereinafter

forth

residue

set

i t e m s d e v i s e d and

A l l of t h e r e s t and r e s i d u e of my p e r s o n a l
and c o n t e n t s /

a u t o m o b i l e s , and t h e l i k e , I l e a v e t o my w i f e
However,

at

of

me,

all

of

if

s h e s u r v i v e s me.

my p e r s o n a l

in the a t t a c h e d

list

my

be

estate

jewelry,

and

shall

property
become a

disposed

of

as

forth.
ARTICLE V
BEQUEST OF RESIDUE £F ESTATE

If
divide

my w i f e
the

referred

to

TRUST P )

and

s u r v i v e s me, my p e r s o n a l

residue

of

as P a r t

A (the

Part

my e s t a t e

B (the

into

representative

two p a r t s ,

hereinafter

"GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX
"MARJORIE S.

PORTION") e a c h a s c e r t a i n e d

SIMS

as h e r e i n a f t e r

shall

BYPASS

MARITAL DEDUCTION

set

forth

in A r t i c l e

VIII.

2

#?£

The Harjorie S. Sims Marital Deduction Portion shall be
distributed

as soon after my death

as practical

to my wife

outright and tree of trust*
The George Grant Sims Estate Tax Bypass Trust shall be held
in Trust by the Trustees hereinafter named for the benefit of my
wife

during her lifetime. The Trustees shall distribute to her

without any conditions, all of the income of said trust.

The

Trustees shall also distribute as mu;:h of the principal as is
necessary for her proper health, support, and maintenance and to
maintain her in the standard ot living that she enjoyed during my
lifetime.

Upon the death of my wife, the Trustee shall pay to

the following persons, the following specific sums:
$10,000.00 to DONALD E. SMITH, MD
$10,000.00 to MARK MUIR, MD
The Trustee shall then distribute the residue of this Trust
in the following manner:
ONE-THIRD:

ELNA MITCHELL

ONE-THIRD:

NEIL MITCHELL

ONE-THIRD:

LINDA WOOD

If any of the above individuals, except LINDA WOOD,

are

then deceased, his or her share shall be distributed to his or
her issue by right of representation.

As to LINDA WOOD, if she

should be deceased at the time of my death, then her share shall

3

I

be d i s t r i b u t e d t o IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHELL, i n e q u a l

shares.

I f my w i f e p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e r e s i d u e o f my e s t a t e s h a l l be
distributed

to:

DONALD E.

SMITH,

MD.

and

MARK MUIR,

MD.#

$ 1 0 , 0 0 0 « 0 0 e a c h and t o ELNA MITCHELL, NEIL MITCHELL and LINDA
WOOD, o n e - t h i r d e a c h ,
predecease

me,

representation.

then

but i f
to

any o f t h e m ,

his

or

her

e x c e p t LINDA WOOD,

issue

by

right

of

If

LINDA WOOD p r e d e c e a s e s me, t h e n h e r s h a r e

s h a l l be d i s t r i b u t e d

t o IAN MITCHELL and AMY MITCHEL%, 'in e q u a l

sharesARTICLE VI
COMMON DISASTER
I n t h e e v e n t my w i f e and I d i e u n d e r sucft c i r c u m s t a n c e s
it

cannot

be

determined

properties

ot

my e s t a t e

were t h e

which
shall

of

us

were

first

be a d m i n i s t e r e d

to

that

die,

all

a s t h o u g h my w i f e

l a s t to die*
ARTICLE V I I
APPOINTMENT OF FIDUCIARIES

1*

A p p o i n t m e n t of P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e .

w i f e t o b e P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f my W i l l ,

I a p p o i n t my

I f my w i f e

does

n o t s u r v i v e me or i s o t h e r w i s e u n a b l e o r u n w i l l i n g t o s e r v e
personal representative,

then I a p p o i n t my nephew, NEIL MITCHELL,

t o s e r v e a s c o - p e r s o n a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of my e s t a t e .
event

both

are

unable

as

or

unwilling

4

to

serve

as

In t h e
Personal

Representative of my Will, the Personal Representative shall be
IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL.
2.

Appointment of Trustees.

MITCHELL,

I appoint my wife and NEIL

to be the co-trustees of the George Grant Sims Estate

Tax Bypass Trust created under this Will.

In the event either

Trustee is unable or unwilling to serve, the other of them shall
serve as Trustee.

In the event both are unable or

unwilling to

servef the other of them shall serve as Trustee.

In the ^vent

both are unable or unwilling to serve as Trustee, the Trustee
shall be IAN MITCHELL, son of NEIL MITCHELL.
3.

Appointment of Guardian and Conservator.

In the event I

become incompetent during my lifetime, I direct that my wife be
appointed the guardian of my person and the conservator ot my
estate.

If she is unable or unwilling to serve, I direct that

NEIL MITCHELL be appointed guardian and conservator or, if he is
unable or unwilling to serve, then IAN MITCHELL, his son shall
serve as the sole guardian and conservator.
conservator shall serve without bond.

My guardian and

I direct that as long as

there are funds available I be taken care of in my home and not
placed in a nursing home or similar facility unless home care is
impossible because of the nature of the care required.

It is my

desire and direction that whatever funds are necessary be spent
for my support, care and maintenance without regard or concern

5

qaC

for

conserving

beneficiaries

any

portion

of

my

estate

for

subsequent

thereof.
ARTICLE V I I I

ASCERTAINMENT OF GEORGE GRANT SIMS ESTATE TAX BYPASS TRUST
AND MARJORIE S^ SIMS MARITAL DEDUCTION PORTION.
If

my w i f e s u r v i v e s me, P a r t A and P a r t B a s s e t f o r t h

A r t i c l e V s h a l l be a s c e r t a i n e d a s
1.
estate

There s h a l l

first

in

follows:

be d e t e r m i n e d t h e v a l u e o f toy g r o s s

{ i n c l u d i n g p r o p e r t y not a d m i n i s t e r e d

i n my e s t a t e ) f o r

the

purpose of t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s F e d e r a l E s t a t e Tax,
2.

There

shall

be d e d u c t e d from such v a l u e t h e amount/

the e x t e n t a l l o w a b l e

a s a d e d u c t i o n i n t h e c o m p u t a t i o n of

Federal

E s t a t e Tax,

and a l l

c l a i m s a g a i n s t my e s t a t e

any e s t a t e ,

of

all

inheritance,

3.

and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n

expenses,

l e g a c y or s u c c e s s i o n

taxes,

The amount s o d e t e r m i n e d s h a l l

to Article III

P a r t A s h a l l be equal t o t h e amount ( c u r r e n t l y

C r e d i t A g a i n s t Tax u n d e r S e c t i o n 2 0 1 0 o f
1986,

a s amended (or i t s

$600,000)

successor)

the Internal

Unified
Revenue

r e d u c e d by t h e

o f (1) a l l i t e m s i n c l u d a b l e i n my e s t a t e f o r f e d e r a l e s t a t e
p u r p o s e s w h i c h a r e d i s p o s e d of

be

above.

t h a t may p a s s f r e e of F e d e r a l E s t a t e Tax by r e a s o n o t the

Code of

the

but t h e r e s h a l l n o t be deducted

transfer,

referred to in Article III.
paid out pursuant

tuneral

to

in previous A r t i c l e s

6

ot t h i s

total
tax
Will

gfl£

or which pass outside of this Will but only if such items do not
qualify for the federal estate tax marital deduction or the
federal estate tax charitable deduction, and (2) the amount of
any administration expenses claimed as income tax rather than
estate tax deductions.

Part A shall be held, administered and

distributed as set forth in Article V.
For purposes o£ allocating my residuary estate between Part
A and Part B, all property owned by me at the time of my death
shall be valued at the same value that was used for federal
estate tax purposes.

If I should die possessed of any terminable

or other interest which cannot quality for the "marital
deduction" under the Federal Estate Tax law, such interest shall
be allocated to this Part A.

If there are any federal or state

estate and inheritance taxes due and payable on my death, they
shall be paid out of the toregoing assets allocated to Part A.
No estate taxes shall be paid out of Part B.
4.

Part B shall consist ot the rest, residue and remainder

of my estate not disposed of pursuant to the foregoing provisions
of my Will,

I hereby direct that whenever possible, assets that

will qualify for the federal estate tax "marital deduction" shall
be allocated to Part B after, however, Part A is properly funded.
If there are assets that

will not qualify for the marital

deduction I direct that those assets be allocated, to the extent

7

p o s s i b l e without exceeding the l i m i t s s e t forth above, to Part A
above*

If t h e r e a r e a s s e t s t h a t w i l l c a u s e the l i m i t a t i o n s on

Part A t o be exceeded, those a s s e t s s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d t o Part B
a l t h o u g h t h e y w i l l not q u a l i f y f o r t h e m a r i t a l d e d u c t i o n .

The

d e c i s i o n of my P e r s o n a l R e p r e s e n t a t i v e as t o the p r o p e r t y t o be
a l l o c a t e d t o Part A and Part B s h a l l be f i n a l and c o n c l u s i v e and
binding upon a l l b e n e f i c i a r i e s .

However,

t o Part B s h a l l have an a g g r e g a t e f a i r
r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of

the property

allocated

market value- c l e a r l y

the appreciation or d e p r e c i a t i o n

in the value

t o the d a t e of d a t e s of each d i s t r i b u t i o n of a l l p r o p e r t y then
a v a i l a b l e for d i s t r i b u t i o n .
any e s t a t e ,

inheritance,

Part B s h a l l not be d i m i n i s h e d by

transfer,

d u t i e s , e i t h e r s t a t e or f e d e r a l .

legacy or s u c c e s s i o n taxes or
If t h e v a l u e of my r e s i d u a r y

e s t a t e i s l e s s than the amount t h a t may be a l l o c a t e d t o Part A
(currently $600,000),

no part ot my e s t a t e s h a l l be a l l o c a t e d

to

Part B.
ARTICLE IX
TRUSTEE POWERS
Trustee s h a l l have the a d d i t i o n a l
discretions

set

forth

i n P a r t 4,

powers,

Chapter 7,

authorities,

and

Title

the

75 of

Uniform T r u s t e e s ' Powers P r o v i s i o n s of

the Utah Uniform Probate

Code

incorporated

(or

its

successor),

which

reference.

e

are

herein

by

1/ GEORGE GRANT SIMS, the T e s t a t o r , s i g n my name t o t h i s
i n s t r u m e n t t h i s J l ^ day of J u l y , 1 9 9 1 ,

and b e i n g f i r s t

duly

sworn # do hereby declare t o the undersigned a u t h o r i t y that I sign
i t w i l l i n g l y (or w i l l i n g l y d i r e c t another t o s i g n for me), that I
execute

it

as my f r e e

e x p r e s s e d in i t ,

and v o l u n t a r y

act f o r the

purposes

and t h a t I am e i g h t e e n (18) y e a r s of age or

o l d e r , of sound mine f and under no ccffifstp^aint or urjj^ue ij^iyence,

GEORGE GRANT SIMS/ Testator
WE, the u n d e r s i g n e d / as w i t n e s s e s , s i g n our names t o
t h i s instrument, being f i r s t duly sworn, and do hereby declare to
t h e u n d e r s i g n e d a u t h o r i t y t h a t the T e s t a t o r

s i g n s and e x e c u t e

t h i s instrument as h i s Last Will and Testament and that he signs
i t w i l l i n g l y and that each of us, in the presence and hearing of
t h e T e s t a t o r and or each o t h e r , hereby s i g n s t h i s W i l l as w i t n e s s
t o the Testator's s i g n i n g ,
the Testator

and that t o the b e s t of our knowledge

i s 18 y e a r s of age or o l d e r #

of sound mind/ and

under no c o n s t r a i n t or undue influence*
NAME

m

ADDRESS

J*£Y

£J^

&-i/o£

y&

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE)
) SS •
STATE OF UTAH •
)
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN t o b e f o r e me by GEORGE GRANT SIMS #
the

Testator#

l./Ll/Ati

or,

and

F* OV£ieTdKl

witnesses, this

subscribed

and

and

sworn

/to/fafo]

to

before

me

£. D^M

by

,

o?o? day of J u l y , 1991.

My Commission Expires:

yy */

NOTARY
Re s i d I n ^ ^ t ^ ^ v

:

N^S?-'

«••••„. r- r JT^H
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